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Abstract:
The causes of 2007’s financial perturbations and mainly of the subprime crisis are well known at the 
beginning of 2008. Nevertheless, the specialists pay little attention to capital markets global crisis and to 
its consequences. In this study, we demonstrate using Infinancials data, that we are experiencing a global 
capital markets crisis, where the European financial markets are the most affected. The impact of the crisis 
upon the 45 analysed countries differs depending on their industrial structure. Among the other factors 
which led to a different impact of the global crisis we can range the capital markets development and the 
correction of the assets prices boom. The effects of this crisis on the real economy are less obvious at the 
beginning of 2008, especially at European level, but the economic growth forecasts became pessimistic. 
The  credit  activity  is  negatively  influenced  and  the  foreign  exchange  market  crosses  over  a  turbulent 
period.  The  financial crisis consequences  in  respect of  the  real economy will depend on  the  recovery 
capacity of the United States economy.  
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1. Introduction
The United States subprime crisis was largely analysed in the economic literature, but little 
attention is paid to the financial markets global crisis. We are crossing a period with severe 
financial turbulences around the world. At the beginning of 2008 almost all the countries were 
severely touched by the crisis, but the effect of the shock upon the stock prices differed between 
capital markets. 
In  a  recent  study  [Albulescu,  (2008)],  we  have  tried  to  identify  the  factors  which 
contributed to a different impact upon the 45 analysed countries. Analysing the evolution of the 
European capital markets stock prices we discovered that there is no relation between the recent 
financial results of the companies and the drop of the stock prices. In addition, the importance of 
the degradation of macroeconomic fundamentals is not obviously related to the crisis effect. That 
is why we have concluded that the different impact was rather correlated with the stock price 
correction, but those results were not satisfactory. 
In this study we test the correlation between the industrial profile of the countries and the 
impact of the global crisis. The analysed companies were grouped in 18
th industrial sectors in 
order to identify which sectors are more exposed. This method allowed us to demonstrate the 
correlation  between  the  countries’  industrial  profile  and  the  crisis’  impact  upon  the  capital 
markets.
The structure of the article is the following: the first part presents the subprime crisis and its 
repercussions and  the  second  part  presents  the  results  related  to  the  industrial  profile  of the 
analysed countries. Finally, we point out the conclusions. 
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In  the  capitalist  financial  systems,  especially  in  the  market–based  ones,  there  is  a 
continuous  process  of  capital  accumulation.  If  this  process  stops,  the  entire  financial  and 
economic system enters into collapse. This was also the case of the 2007 subprime crisis. 
A financial crisis can be defined in several ways and can take different forms (banking 
crisis, foreign exchange crisis, debt crisis, etc.). A financial crisis can also be defined as a crisis 
which affects the stock exchange markets and the credit markets in a country or in a group of 
countries. If the financial crisis will continue, it can emerge and affect the real economy, leading 
even to a recession. 
In respect of asset prices, real growth and public debt, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) affirmed 
that there is a strong resemblance between 2007 subprime crisis and the other financial crisis. We 
consider that there are also some particular aspects which characterize the actual crisis, like the 
increased  role  of  financial  innovations  (the  securitisation  and  credit  derivatives)  and  a  very 
important contagion phenomenon which began within the American economy and spread over the 
global financial markets, deteriorating the investors’ confidence. 
The shock on the American real estate market has been a starting point for the financial 
turbulences at international scale. At the end of 2006, an important number of clues have already 
announced the international financial markets crisis: depreciation of dollar denominated assets, 
degradation  of  banks  financial  indicators,  reserves  reduction  and  mortgage  credit  problems. 
Between 1997 and 2006, the houses prices increased with about 124% in the United States [The 
Economist, (2007)].
The  financial  turbulences  have  begun  before  the  subprime  crisis.  A  first  contagion 
phenomenon related to stock prices drop was signalled in emerging markets in May 2006 [Mauro, 
and Yafeh, (2007)]. A second event of financial turbulences was represented by the Chinese 
capital  market  disorder  in  February  2007.  The  credit  mortgage  crisis  in  the  United  Stated 
followed.
In the United States, during the ’90, many mortgage loans were granted to debtors with a 
doubtful  repayment  history.  Thereby,  in  2006  these  subprime  loans  represented  600  billion 
dollars, reaching about 20% of the total mortgage loans. The default rate increased to 42% in 
2006  as  compared  with  2005  [Lasserre,  (2007)].  In  2007,  the  volume  of  subprime  loans 
represented 13% of total loans amount (about 1300 billion  dollars) and the delinquency rate 
increased to 15% in 2007 as compared with 10% in 2005 [Banque de France, (2007)].
These doubtful loans were known as “2/28” and “3/27” and the most part of these loans 
were adjustable rate mortgages loans (ARM), granted without assessing the repayment capacity 
of their beneficiaries [Schumer, and Maloney, (2007)]. For example, a hybrid ARM “2/28” is 
characterized by a fix interest rate, adjusted every six months, depending on a reference rate. In 
2007,  the  adjustment  of  the  ARM  caused  a  30%  increase  of  the  payments  amount,  and  an 
important part of the borrowers were no longer able to pay.
This situation was well known a few years ago, but a considerable number of specialists 
argued that the exponential increase of real estate prices is justified by the financial innovation 
and the Asiatic capital flow towards the United States. The US wealth contraction in 2007, the 
credit spread growth and the malfunctioning of credit market contradicted their theory. 
Equally, the international macroeconomic climate deteriorates. The previous period was 
called by the specialists – “The Great Moderation”. This period is characterised by a low inflation 
and an ongoing increase of the real GDP
1.  However, in the last years, several events occurred 
and contributed to the economic climate deterioration. The surplus of savings in countries like 
China and the interest of the petroleum exporting countries to limit the appreciation of their 
currencies toward the American dollar contributed to the economic deterioration of the US The 
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financial inflation was also considerable before the start of the crisis and the FED and ECB 
contributed to its amplification, by maintaining a liquidity excess in the market.     
But  the  most  important  factors  which  contributed  to  the  crisis  appearance  were  the 
financial  innovations  (represented  by  the  securitization  activity  and  the  credit  derivatives), 
combined with the imperfections of the regulatory and surveillance activities.
The securitization process is described by Durand (2007). The banks set up the so called 
“package” of mortgage loans (repackaging process), with different risk profiles (the subprime 
loans are the most likely to make default), and declined the property of this loans to investors 
which assumed the risk (especially to the hedge funds). The risk transfer is possible under the 
form of securities which can be negotiated on the market (asset–backed securities – ABS). If the 
loans are mortgage loans, we speak about “mortgage backed securities”. 
The credit derivatives also give to banks the possibility to take an important part of their 
credit portfolio off from the balance sheet. Several reasons are in favour of this option. The first 
one  is  represented  by  a  better  financial  situation  of  the  balance  sheet  which  increases  the 
investors’ confidence in the bank. Another reason is the interest rate arbitrage which gives to the 
banks  the  possibility  to  take  profit  on  the  difference  between  the  interest  obtained  by  the 
intermediary  entities  who  invested  in  the  outstanding  debt  of  the  bank  (the  Special  Purpose 
Vehicle – SPV) and the interest which must be paid to investors, indirectly, by means of the same 
SPV [Léonard, (2008)]. 
The regulation process deficiencies also represent an important factor of the recent crisis. 
The Basel I implementation pushed the financial firms to avoid the capital constraints and to sell 
a part of the granted loans. The new Agreement – Basel II – is less rigid, but it still does not use 
the loss distribution. The stress–test methodology takes indeed into account the extreme loss 
distribution, but it was not often used in practice.  
The subprime crisis extended at international  level, following two main directions: the 
credit crunch and the capital markets turmoil. In our study we analyse the contagion phenomenon 
on the stock markets, trying to find out the reason for which the stock markets were differently 
affected around the world. Our analysis is similar to the Balit Moussalli’s (2007) who studied the 
different impact of the Asian crisis. 
Up to now, the impact of the crisis on the real economy is not so evident. That is why the 
specialists speak about a paradox of the actual crisis [Riskbank, (2007); Landau, (2007); Noyer, 
(2007)]. Any employed indicator (spread or volatility) shows that the shock on the credit markets 
and  on  the  stock  exchange  is  important  and  the  losses  are  considerable.  However,  these 
spectacularly losses incurred by some companies, do not appear like a major threat to financial 
stability.  
The international financial crisis was amplified by the loss of investors’ confidence and by 
the speculation process. We consider that the financial system learned to respond to the financial 
turbulences and the effects of the crisis are delayed. The losses incurred will have an important 
impact upon the real economy, but it is difficult to forecast when the end of the crisis occurs. 
Before we proceed to the analysis of the factors which contribute to a different propagation 
of the crisis in the stock markets, we will show that we are crossing a global financial crisis. The 
analysis  is  made  in  February  2008,  six  month  after  the  start  of  the  subprime  crisis.  For 
demonstrating  that  the  stock  market  crisis  has  an  international  extension,  we  have  used 
Infinancials data for 45 countries (more than 20.000 listed companies, grouped in 18 industrial 
sectors). The stock price at 6 months drops for the large majority of the countries, except for 
several  emerging  economies.  However,  at  the  beginning  of  2008,  only  the  stock  market  in 
Bahrain knew a slight increase. In all the other markets, the stock prices decreased. In order to 
obtain a robust analysis, we have worked with the average stock prices variation, for all the 
companies listed, but also for the 10 largest companies. We also performed the analysis for the
stock market representative index. The results of the two last analyses are similar to the first one. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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That  is  why  we  present  in  the  following  graph  the  stock  prices  evolution  for  all  the  listed 
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Figure 1: Average stock prices evolution for all the listed companies
Figure 1 shows that only five emerging countries (Brazil, Argentine, China, Russia and 
South Africa) recorded a positive evolution of the stock prices at six months. Czech Republic 
joins  this  group,  being  the  single  European  country  which  was  not  severely  affected  by  the 
contagion phenomenon (the investors’ anticipations had an important role in this case). However, 
in 2008 all this countries were touched by the crisis.   
Analysing Figure 1  we can see  that the impact  of the  crisis in  not  similar among  the 
countries taken into account. In order to identify the geographic zones which were more affected, 
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Figure 2: Average stock prices evolution by continentJournal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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Up to now, we showed that the international capital markets experience a severe crisis. In 
the rest of the paper we try to identify the factors which led to a different propagation of the 
crisis, taking into account the countries’ industrial profile. 
3. The industrial profile and the crisis impact
In  our  previous  paper  [Albulescu,  (2008)],  we  focused  on  the  relation  between  the 
evolution  of  the  companies’  financial  situation  and  the  evolution  of  the  stock  prices,  in  the 
context of the capital markets global crisis. We found out that there is no relation between these 
two  variables.  Apparently,  it  seems  that  the  evolution  of  the  macroeconomic  context  of  the 
countries does not represent either a viable response (i.e. Poland and Romania were strongly 
affected by the capital market crisis but their economic situation improved during the last years). 
It appears that a strong price correction took place on the stock exchange which recorded a price 
increased above the average.
These  explanations  are  not  completely  satisfactory;  that  is  why  we  proceed  to  a 
supplementary analysis – we investigate the stock price evolution by industrial sector in order to 
make a comparison with the industrial profile of the analysed countries
2. The 18 industrial sectors 
are: food, insurances, automotive, banks, consumer durables goods, industrial goods, travel & 
leisure, construction, chemicals, healthcare, media, oil & gas, primary resources, retail, financial 
services, technology, telecommunications, utilities. 
If we inspect the stock price evolution by sectors (Figure 3), we can observe that for all the 
sectors the average stock prices recorded negative evolutions at 3 months, respectively at 1 month 
(corresponding to 2008). The actual level of the stock prices, as compared with the prices level 
from 6 months ago, shows that the trend was favourable only for two sectors (primary resources 
and telecommunications). The industries of automobiles, consumer durables and industrial goods, 
media and technology, were the most affected. Taking into consideration the fact that the crisis 
initially emerged in the financial sectors (banks, financial services and insurances), we expected 
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Source: INFINANCIALS database
                                                
2 In  Global  Europe  Anticipation  Bulletin  [GEAB,  (2006)],  the  specialists  estimated  the  sectors 
which will be the most affected by the crisis: international trade, exchange market, financial sector and 
energetic sector.Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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Figure 3: Average stock prices evolution by industrial sectors
We proceed now to a comparison between the countries and the sectors that were the most 
affected, and those that were less influenced by the crisis. In order to do that, we have built Figure 
4. 
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Figure 4: Comparison between the impact of the crisis at country level and at sectoral level
Because  the  6  month  variation  is  the  most  representative  to  monitor  the  stock  price 
dynamics, we present only these data. Several findings can be highlighted after analysing Figure 
4. Firstly, the financial sectors are not the most exposed to the stock market crisis. The most 
affected industrial sectors are the consumer durable goods, automotive sector and media. On the 
contrary,  the  less  affected sectors  are  the  telecommunications  and  the  primary  resources. 
Secondly, if we look now to the countries that were the most affected by the crisis, these are the 
three European countries: Poland, Romania and Italy. The less affected between all the analysed 
countries is  Bahrain  (a  tax  heaven  country
3),  Brazil and  China (two emerging  countries).  In 
Europe,  Denmark  and  Germany  stock  exchanges  suffered  the  smallest  losses,  which  were, 
                                                
3 Figure 2 shows that the tax heaven countries were severely affected by the stock prices crisis. 
Bahrain represents an exception. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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however, significant (–15% of the market capitalisation at 6 months). The Czech Republic is the 
single European country which was not touched by the crisis at the beginning of 2008. 
Analysing the industrial profile of these countries, we reach two conclusions. The primary 
resources  sector  is  important  in  the  emerging  countries,  and  the  telecommunication  industry 
develops quickly. Taking into consideration the fact that these two sectors were less affected by 
the crisis, we may find an explanation related to its impact. But if we look only to the European 
countries, the reasoning fails. The automotive sectors and media (the most affected by the stock 
market  crisis)  are well  developed  in  the  European industrialised countries like  Germany  and 
Denmark.  The  automobile  industry  is  well  developed  in  Czech Republic also. If we  look  at 
Romania and Poland we see that the primary resources sector has a significant presence in these 
countries. Moreover, the durable goods sector is also strong because the transition imposed a 
“catching–up” process related to life quality in these countries. 
These findings show that there is a connection between the industrial profile and the crisis 
impact on the capital market, but this relation does not apply for the European countries. It is 
difficult to defend the idea that the industrial profile of the country is responsible for the different 
impact of the global capital market crisis in all the countries. The development of the capital 
markets and the previous sharp increase of the stock prices seem the most plausible elements to 
explain the different impact of the crisis. 
4. Conclusion
The  first  financial  crisis  of  the  21
st  century  is  characterized  by  esoteric  instruments, 
unaware regulators and skittish investors [Reinhart, and Rogoff, (2008)]. The authorities accepted 
the  severity  of  the  crisis  too  late  and  their  intervention  was  hesitant.  The  recent  turmoil 
highlighted  the  phenomena  of  spillover  between  countries  and  financial  markets  [de  Rato, 
(2007)].
The  subprime  crisis  represented  the  starting  point  for  the  global  credit  crisis  and 
international capital market crisis. In this study we have analysed the stock market crisis and the 
factors which contributed to a different impact of the crisis upon the stock exchange markets all 
over the world. In a recent study we have showed that there is no relation between the financial 
situation of listed companies and the evolution of the stock prices. In this paper we investigate the 
relation between the countries’ industrial profile and the stock prices drop. 
The  first  conclusion  is  that  all  the  countries  and  all  the  sectors  were  affected  by  the 
international capital market crisis. Another conclusion is that the European countries recorded 
important falls of the stock prices.  A third conclusion is  related to  the most and to  the less 
affected sectors: the consumer durable goods, the automotive sector and media experienced a 
severe correction of the stock prices, whereas the telecommunications and the primary resources 
sectors were less affected (see Figure 4 which presents the stock price variation at 6 months). The 
most important conclusion is that the industrial profile of the countries led to a different impact of 
the crisis, but this assertion is not valid for the European countries as an individual group. The 
correction of the sharp increase of the stock prices explains better the crisis different effects.
The  economic  consequences  of  the  crisis  are  not  well  known  at  present.  The  first 
estimation related to the subprime crisis was optimistic: “The fundamentals remain robust, the 
profits of the companies, banks, and financial institutions are high and the economic growth 
prospect  is  good”  [Banque  de  France,  (2007)].    Likewise,  Buiter  (2007)  observes  a  sign  of 
economic stabilization towards the second half of 2008. These signs are represented by the action 
of major banks related to the inclusion of the off balance sheet elements into their balance sheet. 
Besides, the liquidities of high savings countries like the countries of the Gulf Region, China and 
Russia  were  oriented  towards  the  financial  markets  severely  affected  by  the  crisis.  Many 
American banks were rescued by the sovereign funds from the emerging markets. This situation 
also leads to a change in the diplomatic and political relationship at international level.Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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But, at the end of 2007, the financial indicators deteriorated and the investor’s confidence 
consequently declined. The specialists of Riksbank (2007) consider that the main threat to the 
economic development is represented by the real estate situation in the United States. GEAB 
(2008) foresaw that the American economy will enter into recession. 
We consider that the international financial crisis will continue. The financial market crisis 
has already been followed by important frictions on the foreign exchange market. The real estate 
market is also fragile in many countries. If the United States economy enters into recession, the 
impact of the crisis amplifies at global level. Taking into account the fact that the main central 
banks proceeded to a monetary tightening, the probability of a global recession is considerably 
high.  
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